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TAX INCIDENCE AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 
 
Bret N. Bogenschneider* 
 
Abstract 
 
The „small open economy‟ model is typically given as the analytic framework 
for corporate tax incidence.  Economists have applied the framework to 
justify tax policies premised on relatively high rates of labor taxation in both 
the United States and Europe.  However, the „small open economy‟ model is 
extremely controversial and has been challenged on various grounds.  Here, 
the additional criticism is developed that the „small open economy‟ model is 
not based on scientific methods of inquiry.  An alternative theory is proposed 
referred to as the „small person economy‟ model, where „small persons‟ are 
presumed to pay labor taxes out of current earnings thereby reducing 
economic welfare directly.  This also entails a „pass-through‟ incidence effect 
via reduced consumer spending in the macroeconomy causing an efficiency 
loss.  The reformulated „small person economy‟ has significant implications 
for tax policy design.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The „small open economy‟ model is typically given as the analytical 
framework for tax incidence analysis.1  The model sets out to address the 
question: Who bears the burden of the corporate income tax?2  
Notwithstanding it is labeled as a „model‟ it is actually a leading theory in the 
field of public economics.  Arnold Harberger first derived the model as what he 
called a „revolution‟ against an outdated prior theory from the 1940´s and 
1950´s.3  Harberger ultimately proposed various „„open‟- and „closed‟-economy 
iterations which yield wildly different results as to tax incidence.4  However, this 
redux approach to modeling also introduced a great deal of analytical 
complexity.  Harberger claimed that in a „closed‟ economy labor bears some 
portion of the incidence of capital taxation depending on the parameters of the 
                                                            
* Senior Lecturer, Finance Law and Ethics, University of Surrey. 
1 Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, (1962) 70 Journal of 
Political Economy 215; Arnold C. Harberger, Tax Policy in a Small, Open Developing Economy, 
(1985) in The Economics of the Caribbean Basin (M. B. Connolly ed.); John Mutti & Harry 
Grubert, The Taxation of Capital Income in an Open Economy: The Importance of Resident-
Nonresident Tax Treatment, (1985) 27 Journal of Political Economy 291.  For the extension of 
the ´small open economy´ model beyond the small open economy context see A. Lans 
Bovenberg, Capital Income Taxation in Growing Open Economies, (1986) 31 Journal of Political 
Economy 347; Anne Sibert, Taxing Capital in a Large, Open Economy, (1990) 41 Journal of 
Political Economy 297. 
2 Alan Auerbach, Who Bears the Corporate Tax: A Review of What We Know, (2006) 20 Tax 
Policy and the Economy 1. 
3 Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax Revisited, (2008) 61:2 
National Tax Journal 303, 304.  
4 Ibid, 304-5; Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, (2005) 103 Michigan Law 
Review 807, note 329 („Arnold Harberger, an early advocate of the view that some or all of the 
burden is borne by capital, now feels it is mostly borne by labor.‟) citing Arnold C. Harberger, 
Monetary and Fiscal Policy for Equitable Economic Growth (1998) in Income Distribution and 
High-Quality Growth 203 (Tanzi & Chu, eds.) (Cambridge: MIT Press). 
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model,5 whereas in the „small open economy‟ model labor bears the full 
incidence of capital taxation to a rate of greater than 100 per cent.6  Such a 
result is possible because corporate taxes are claimed to reduce aggregate 
economic output reflecting the effects of a „deadweight loss‟ of taxation, 
subsequently referred to as the „Harberger triangle‟.7  The results are further 
given under the condition of „general equilibrium‟ defined as „equalizing real 
wages and real after-tax rates of return across two sectors‟.8   
The muddiness of the respective models has the effect of obfuscating the 
results, and only a few intrepid authors have even set out to discuss the 
„numeraire‟ or price-level to be applied therein.9  Notably, the choice of 
„numeraire‟ is a fundamental question in the model and changing it can reverse 
yet again the policy recommendations derived therefrom.10  The current 
obfuscated wisdom is thus the „closed‟ economy result (ie, that labor bears some 
significant portion of the incidence of capital taxation) first reversed, and then 
reversed again, yielding a result back to something akin to the original.  
However, the re-reversal of Harberger´s analysis renders the explanatory theory 
behind the „closed‟ economy model essentially void even if the ultimate results 
are pleasing.11  Various legal scholars thus cynically conclude the analytics of tax 
incidence modeling are presented „with no weighting as to which is more likely 
to hold in reality‟12 and thus lack practical validity.13 
                                                            
5 Ibid, 304 („In the interesting case where Cobb-Douglas production functions prevail in both 
sectors, and where product demands are determined by a Cobb-Douglas utility function, capital 
ends up bearing precisely the full burden of the tax.‟); see also Jane G. Gravelle, The Corporate 
Income Tax: A Persistent Policy Challenge, (2011) 11 Florida Tax Review 75.  
6 See George R. Zodrow, Economic Analyses of Capital Gains Taxation: Realizations, Revenues, 
Efficiency and Equity, (1993) 48 Tax Law Review 419, 482-3; see also Kern Alexander, 
International Regulatory Reform and Financial Taxes, (2010) 13:3 Journal of International 
Economic Law 893 (discussing the incidence of banking and financial industry taxes). 
7 See Mark Glick, Is Monopoly Rent Seeking Compatible with Wealth Maximization?‟ 1994 
Brigham Young University Law Review 499, 503 citing F.M. Sherer & David Ross, Industrial 
Market Structure and Economic Performance 667, 3rd ed. (1990) (Boston: Houghton Mifflin). 
8 Harberger „Incidence Revisited‟, 304. 
9 See e.g. Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution via Taxation: The Limited Role of the 
Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, (2005) 52 UCLA Law Review 1627, 1640 
(„Serious conceptual issues exist in all exercises that attempt to put quantitative flesh on the 
skeleton of conventional incidence theory. It is conceptually challenging to measure the 
incidence of an entire tax system because doing so effectively assumes that all relative prices, 
technology, and output levels would have remained unchanged´); Bret N. Bogenschneider, The 
Tax Paradox of Capital Investment, (2015) 33:1 Journal of Taxation of Investments 59, 64-5 
(´The “numeraire” is the underlying price in which other prices are expressed. A price level 
numeraire is necessary to establish a relative price level in the context of tax incidence…The 
logical fallacy of excluding a numeraire in the economic model is set forth using symbolic logic‟). 
10 Ibid, 75-8. 
11 See generally Razeen Sappideen, Imputation of the Corporate and Personal Income Tax: Is It 
Chasing One's Tail? (1998) 15 American Journal of Tax Policy 167, 193 (´It is difficult to take 
seriously Harberger's estimates of the loss in output resulting from the double-taxation of 
dividends in the corporate sector…. Clearly tax discrimination against particular legal forms of 
enterprise or particular asset classes must involve a cost in the misallocation of capital. The cost 
takes the form of a loss in output, but to attempt to quantify that cost, even in the crudest sense, 
may result in a totally misleading impression.‟). 
12 Bird & Zolt, 1642 („Because no one knows the true incidence of the corporate tax, many studies 
simply present alternative scenarios, with no weighting as to which is more likely to hold in 
reality.‟). 
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Other legal scholars and many economists proceed as if the general 
assumptions of the „small open economy‟ model are correct.14  The non-
obfuscated wisdom derived from the „small open economy‟ model is thus held to 
be that capital is „mobile‟, labor is not „mobile‟, and therefore, labor bears some 
significant portion of the incidence of capital taxation.15  So, taxing capital really 
hurts workers.16  And, not just some workers, but all workers in a given 
economy.17  Harberger is careful to make that broader point of public policy.18  
However, the actual ratio of the portion of capital taxation borne by labor is the 
subject of intense empirical debate.19  Kimberly Clausing writes: 
 
Some of the results above appear to support the hypothesis that higher 
corporate tax rates lower wages. But the complete body of evidence casts 
doubt, and the evidence in support of the main channel of causality in open-
economy general equilibrium corporate tax incidence models is not 
persuasive … At the end of the searching, I find some evidence that suggests 
that corporate taxation may lower wages, but the preponderance of evidence 
does not suggest any wage effects from corporate taxation.20 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
13 See David Howarth, Law as Engineering: Thinking about What Lawyers Do (2014) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press). 
14 See e.g. Adam H. Rosenzweig, A Corporate Tax for the Next One Hundred Years: A Proposal 
for a Dynamic, Self-Adjusting Corporate Tax Rate, (2014) 108 Northwestern University Law 
Review 1029, 1033 (“This Article, relying on these developments in the theoretical and empirical 
economics literature, will work under the assumption that, under the unique conditions of the 
modern economy, increasing amounts of the corporate income tax are often borne by labor 
rather than capital.”). 
15 See Rosanne Altshuler, Benjamin H. Harris & Eric Toder, Capital Income Taxation and 
Progressivity in a Global Economy, (2010) 30 Virginia Tax Review 355, 362-3 (“The corporate 
income tax is modeled as an add-on tax on capital income in the domestic corporate sectors. 
Randolph assumes that capital is perfectly mobile across countries, labor is immobile, land is 
used in the agricultural sector only, and markets are perfectly competitive. Worldwide supplies 
of capital and labor are fixed.  The incidence results in Randolph's model are straightforward. 
The corporate tax induces a reallocation of capital abroad that increases the productivity of 
foreign labor and consequently raises wages abroad. The final allocation of burdens between 
factors of production depends on model parameters.”) citing William Randolph, International 
Burdens of the Corporate Income Tax 5 (Congressional Budget Office, Working Paper 2006-09, 
August) <www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/75xx/doc7503/2006-09.pdf>. 
16 Ibid, 357 („This logic suggests there may be both efficiency gains and increases in progressivity 
from shifting taxes on corporate equity income from the corporate to the shareholder level… 
This means that the corporate-level tax may raise the cost of corporate capital… more than it 
lowers after-tax returns to U.S. investors. As a result, some analysts have suggested that the 
corporate income tax is mostly shifted to U.S. workers through a decline in the capital-labor 
ratio in the United States, although others dispute this finding.‟). 
17 Harberger „Incidence Revisited‟, 303 („Capital will flee from areas with lowered rates of return 
and, as it does, so will move the whole capital markets to a new equilibrium rate of return.  
Thus, all segments of the capital market will tend to share in whatever fate ends up being 
inflicted on the equilibrium net-of-tax return of corporate shareholders.‟). 
18 Harberger „Incidence Revisited‟, 305 („Thus, whatever tax ends up being paid in that sector 
has to be reflected as a reduction in the real wage rate paid there. But we cannot have real wages 
falling in one sector and not in another (except during a transition period). So the fall in real 
wages that permits manufacturing to stay in business in the taxing country has to apply 
through-out the labor market of that country.‟). 
19 See Kimberly Clausing, In Search of Corporate Tax Incidence, (2012) 65 Tax Law Review 433. 
20 Ibid, 460, 480. 
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The incidence of capital taxation no significant empirical study has been 
commissioned on the question of the incidence of labor taxation or portion of 
labor taxes borne by capital.21  Hence, much of the prior study of tax incidence 
relates solely to the incidence of the corporate income tax rather than the 
incidence of capital and labor taxes taken in combination.  If money is fungible, 
then a more comprehensive incidence analysis is required including the 
incidence of labor taxation which is missing from prior empirical studies.  The 
prior methodology is troubling for many reasons; most particularly, the 
empirical study of tax incidence was premised on the conclusions of 
Harberger´s „model‟ which was purportedly also the subject of the test.22  
Clausing casts further doubt on the implications of the „small open economy‟ 
model for several pragmatic reasons. First, Clausing argues that transfer pricing 
allows firms to shift costs without moving capital;23 and second, she points out 
that large corporate firms behave as if the incidence of capital taxation is borne 
by capital.24 
Apart from the raw economic analysis, the tax policy implications of the 
„small open economy‟ model represent something akin to the „holy grail‟ of 
normative tax theory.  That is, the modern-day „classical liberal‟ Libertarians led 
by Richard Epstein, set out to justify by Lockean principles of „natural law‟ a 
system of taxation of wealth maximization for the minimization of property (ie, 
capital) taxation.25  The tax-„holy grail‟ in moral terms is hence an economic 
proof for the normative argument:  When I pay taxes on capital it hurts both 
you and I, when you pay taxes on your labor it hurts only you.  Therefore, in 
order to maximize wealth you should pay the taxes on your labor and I should 
not pay tax on my capital.26  And, this justification is to some extent what the 
“small open economy” model purports to be.27   
                                                            
21 For the incidence of “payroll taxation” see Candice Prendergast, The Empirical Content of 
Pay-for-Performance, 31:2 Journal of Law Economics & Organization 242 citing J. Gruber, 
„The Incidence of Payroll Taxation: Evidence from Chile‟, (1997) 15 Journal of Labor 
Economics; Bogenschneider „Tax Paradox‟, 69 citing Rupert Sendlhofer, Incidence of Social 
Security Contributions and Taxes: Empirical Evidence From Austria (Discussion Paper 2001/1 
Institute of Public Economics, University of Innsbruck, Austria, 2001) 
<www.aiel.it/Old/bacheca/FIRENZE/Papers/Sendlhofer.pdf>. 
22 Clausing, 444 („Studies often consider the effect of corporate tax on wages, controlling for 
value added or capital-to-labor ratios thereby controlling for the very mechanism they are 
purporting to study.‟). 
23 Ibid, 467 (“Yet, accompanying this globalization, there has been an increased divergence 
between the location of economic activity (such as, investment, employment and sales) and the 
location of income for tax purposes.”). 
24 Ibid, 469 („[Lawrence Summers] noted at a Hamilton Project forum in 2007 that it was indeed 
possible that corporate stockholders and managers who resist the corporate tax are not really 
acting in their own interests because they do not understand corporate tax incidence, since 
corporate taxes will ultimately be borne by their workers. But it seems far more plausible that 
they have calculated their interests correctly.‟). 
25 See Richard Epstein, Taxation with Representation: Or, the Libertarian Dilemma, (2005) 18 
Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 7. 
26 Richard A. Epstein, Taxation in a Lockean World, (1986) 4:1 Journal of Social Philosophy & 
Policy 49, 64-5 („[D]eferment looks wealth-enhancing and, hence, Pareto-superior… but the 
debate here would not be on the soundness of the general criteria, but on their application to a 
particular case – a second order problem.‟); see also David Hasen, Liberalism and Ability 
Taxation, (2007) 85 Texas Law Review 1057, 1080; George Mundstock, Taxation of 
Intercorporate Dividends Under an Unintegrated Regime, (1998) 44 Tax Law Review 1, 22 
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The epistemological problem is that neither Harberger´s comparison of 
synthetic economic „models‟, nor Epstein´s restatement of Locke in Posnerian 
„wealth maximizing‟ terms,28 constitutes „science‟ because the analysis does not 
purport to relate to the real world.  Both arguments posit a hypothetical „world‟ 
(ie, the „Lockean World‟ and „small open economy‟ model) and set out to derive 
tax policy by analogy from the hypothetical world.  And, this appears to be in 
part an exercise in rhetoric, which Donald McCloskey famously defended within 
the field of economics generally.29  A critique of normative economic „modeling‟ 
in these terms will thus entail an encounter with McCloskey and radical 
subjectivity in economics.30  Indeed, the acknowledgements to McCloskey´s 
seminal Article on subjectivism in economic theory indicate Richard Rorty 
contributed to that piece directly.31   
The current Article is accordingly organized as follows:  First, the prior 
tax incidence analyses are introduced and critiqued. The subjectivist approach 
to economic theory as famously given by McCloskey is then discussed in detail.  
Next, an alternative model of tax incidence, the „Small Person Economy Model 
of Tax Incidence‟ is proposed.  In conclusion, the tax policy implications of the 
„small open‟- versus „small person‟-economy models are compared in detail. 
 
CRITIQUE OF THE „SMALL OPEN ECONOMY‟ MODEL OF TAX 
INCIDENCE 
 
To begin we need to first distinguish a „model‟ from a „theory‟.  An 
economic „model‟ generally describes an economy in a synthetic universe with 
defined rules.  However, the synthetic universe does not truly exist.  McCloskey 
accordingly defined models as metaphors.32  On the other hand, a „theory‟ is an 
idea used to generate a prediction about future events in the real world.33  
Hence, a „theory‟ is always designed to relate to the real economy.  As 
mentioned above, empirical studies on tax incidence actually turn out to be 
                                                                                                                                                                              
(„The double tax, as compared to a lower single tax in an unintegrated regime, increases the cost 
of capital to corporations. This discourages capital intensive means of production by 
corporations. Similarly, the double tax on corporate taxable income increases the total tax borne 
by savings, potentially discouraging saving.‟).   
27 See Jane G. Gravelle, Economic Effects of Taxing Capital Income 75-90 (1991) (Cambridge: 
MIT Press). 
28 See Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 14, 4th ed. (1992). 
29 Donald McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics, (1983) 21:2 Journal of Economic Literature 
481; see also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax 
Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, (1987) 86 Michigan Law Review 465. 
30 Ibid, 487 („Some philosophers now doubt the entire enterprise of epistemology and its claim 
to provide foundations for knowledge.  A great many doubt the prescriptions of modernist 
methodology.‟) citing Richard Rorty, The Fate of Philosophy, (1982) 187:16 The New Republic 
28. 
31 Ibid, 482. 
32 Ibid, 502 („Models are Metaphors. The most important example of economic rhetoric, 
however, falls well outside the border of self-consciousness.  It is the language economists use, 
and in particular, its metaphors.  To say that markets can be represented by supply and demand 
“curves” is no less a metaphor than to say that the west wind is “the breath of autumn´s 
being.”‟). 
33 See generally Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and 
the Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 2002 University of Illinois Law Review 875.  
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more consistent with Harberger´s „closed‟-economy version.   The „closed‟-
economy iteration of Harberger´s theory does not seem to realistically relate to 
any economy anywhere.  Although admittedly spurious, the „closed‟-economy 
results are nonetheless of more predictive value for tax policymakers than the 
small „open‟-economy model.  The paradox is then that economists still apply 
the „small open economy‟ model in any policy discussion of tax incidence even 
though the empirical world is set apart from the underlying „model‟.   
Any comparison of synthetic world as part of an economic „model‟ is an 
inductive comparison of the relative strengths or merits of each „model‟ based 
on the expectations of the reviewing economist.  This is true even where models 
apply deductive reasoning inside the model.  Such an inductive comparison of 
„models‟ is an illustration of what Karl Popper set out to exclude from the 
epistemology of science.34  Deductive reasoning inside an economic model does 
not automatically yield „science‟.  Hence, the process of comparing synthetic 
economic „models‟ which are not purported to reflect the real world is not 
strictly „science‟.  Modeling would be more aptly used in the physical sciences to 
test a model and not to derive it.  For example, Albert Einstein proposed, and 
Popper reiterated, that the origin of hypothesis is in „creative intuition‟.35  With 
regard to the empirical idea of proceeding directly from statistical analysis to 
theory as science, Thomas Kuhn said the following: „[T]he road from scientific 
law to scientific measurement can rarely be travelled in the reverse direction.‟36 
The origins of scientific discovery are hence theory, and certainly not 
mathematical models.   
Harberger´s approach to tax incidence is an illustration of non-„science‟ 
for yet another reason.  By positing first one „closed‟- model, and then another 
„open‟-economy model, the results become nearly tautological.  Any attempt to 
test the framework seems to yield results consistent with either one approach or 
the other.  Popper referred to this as a form of hedgehog defense of 
„conventionalism‟ in scientific inquiry.37 Harberger´s self-proclaimed 
                                                            
34 Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1935/2002) (Vienna: Springer; reprinted: 
London: Routledge), 24 („[A] subjective experience, or a feeling of conviction, can never justify a 
scientific statement, and that within science it can play no part except that of an object of an 
empirical (a psychological) inquiry.‟); see also Phoebe Ellsworth, Legal Reasoning and Scientific 
Reasoning, (2012) 63 Alabama Law Review 895, 898  („Scientific and legal reasoning are 
typically described as involving two distinct methods: deductive and inductive reasoning. In 
science, deductive reasoning involves the derivation of specific predictions from a general theory 
or set of axioms.‟). 
35 Ibid, 8 („[M]y view of the matter, for what it is worth, is that there is no such thing as a logical 
method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this process. My view may be 
expressed by saying that every discovery contains “an irrational element”, or “a creative 
intuition”…Einstein speaks of the “search for those highly universal laws . . . from which a 
picture of the world can be obtained by pure deduction. There is no logical path”, he says, 
“leading to these . . . laws. They can only be reached by the logic of science intuition, based upon 
something like an intellectual love (“Einfühlung”) of the objects of experience.”‟ quoted from A. 
Einstein, Mein Weltbild, 1934, 168 (A. Harris, tr.) in „The World as I see It‟, 1935, 125). 
36 McCloskey, 490 citing Ronald Coase, How Should Economists Choose? The G. Warren Nutter 
Lectures in Political Economy (1982) (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute), 19; 
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (1970) (University of Chicago 
Press).  
37 Popper, 59 („Whenever the “classical” system of the day is threatened by the results of new 
experiments which might be interpreted as falsifications according to my point of view, the 
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„revolution‟ with the „small open‟ economy model has thus now become the 
convention of a prior era.  The optimistic case for the „small open economy‟ 
model in the field of public economics is that economists-qua-scientists are fully 
aware the model does not relate to the real world (i.e., that the real world is not 
the „small‟ open economy at all) yet, the „small open economy‟ model is also a 
theory which economists choose to apply (in a Bayesian sense).  To put lipstick-
on-a-model then, the best case is that Harberger´s „model‟ has indirectly 
morphed into something akin to a scientific „theory‟ of tax incidence.   
The morphing of models to theory is acutely necessary in any field which 
does not accept a modern version of the scientific method where science is 
understood as the testing (or augmentation) of theory.  In other words, where 
„theory‟ is excluded from the scientific method, then all empirical testing is 
conducted by a trial-and-error method to which any „model‟ is equally as helpful 
(or perhaps more helpful) than any „theory‟.  Any „model‟ that can be imagined 
by an economist can immediately be proposed as a matter of economic 
epistemology and subjectively compared to any other „model‟ by an inductive 
method. This is of course very convenient for economists operating in the field 
of taxation, since such a non-scientific approach also excludes „clinicians‟ of 
taxpayer behavior, such as tax lawyers and accountants, from the scientific 
method entirely.  In the extraordinarily unlikely case that a model derived by 
this process is relevant to anything it would be as a result of a trial-and-error 
(i.e., non-clinical) research methodology.  
A trial-and-error research methodology does not apply the „scientific 
method‟ not because it cannot reach valid results, but because a trial-and-error 
method is simply an inefficient means of study, but especially in the social 
sciences which involve variate human behaviors.  A better approach would be to 
consult clinicians (i.e., tax lawyers and accountants) with practical knowledge of 
taxation in the first process of deriving a theory of taxation.  Econometric 
methods can then be deployed to test the theory.38 
 
ON THE INCONVENIENCE OF “SCIENCE” TO ECONOMIC THEORY 
 
The positing and systemization of replicable theories on a subject, (i.e., 
theory testable in the real world) is what is generally referred to as „„science‟„.  
But, the tedious requirements of science are troubling to rhetoricians operating 
within the field of economics.39  McCloskey wrote: 
 
Yet even positivists actually behave as though the matters are discussable.  In 
fact, most discussion in most sciences, and especially in economics, arises 
                                                                                                                                                                              
system will appear unshaken to the conventionalist. He will explain away the inconsistencies 
which may have arisen; perhaps by blaming our inadequate mastery of the system.‟). 
38 See generally David Herring, Legal Scholarship, Humility and the Scientific Method, 25 
Quinnipiac Law Review 867 (2007), 871 („The scientific method lies at the core of this approach 
to legal scholarship.  This method is a process of inquiry used by researches in the basic sciences 
and other fields.  Researchers initiate the process by developing a theory that recognizes and 
builds on others´ work in the area of inquiry.  In this way, the scientific method is highly 
collaborative in nature, often generating long lines of inquiry that involve numerous researchers 
over a considerable period.‟). 
39 McCloskey, 483 („Rhetoric is exploring thought by conversation.‟). 
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from them.  Nothing is gained from clinging to the Scientific Method, or to 
any methodology except honesty, clarity, and tolerance.40  
 
In respect of scientific inquiry a „model‟ is helpful to science only if we think the 
specific rules as posited in the synthetic universe are analogous to the real world 
as it is.  A „model‟ that does not assist with theory formation is thus worthless as 
a matter of science.  So, when Clausing implies that modern transfer pricing 
techniques seem to render the analytical framework proposed by Harberger 
radically unrealistic that critique indicates that the theory is not plausible.41 Any 
ostensibly consistent empirical results as derived from such a theory are 
presumptively spurious.  The scientific thing to do with an unrealistic theory is 
to throw it away, unless the theory is tested and the test results are really, really, 
good.  If the test results are really, really, good, it might be worthwhile to study 
the unrealistic theory and see if it draws a competing theory into substantial 
doubt.  The empirical results derived from testing of the „small open economy‟ 
model are not really good, however.  The fact that Harberger´s „small open 
economy‟ model has not been discarded indicates that something else is at play 
in the methodology of economics.  In the modern era, that „something else‟ is an 
economic version of economic subjectivism.   
 
BACONIAN EMPIRICISM IN TAX ECONOMETRICS 
 
With regard to tax incidence and scientific inquiry, the preliminary 
consideration must be identifying the applicable theory of „science‟.  
Econometrics, for example, typically proceeds with an understanding of science 
as given by Sir Francis Bacon as opposed to that given by Karl Popper.42 
Although a full comparison is beyond the scope of this work, Baconian science 
hinges on the scientist „objectively‟ gathering facts in the laboratory from which 
to formulate scientific knowledge.43  As McCloskey explains: „According to the 
modernist methodologist the scientist´s job is not to decide whether 
propositions are useful for understanding and changing the world but to classify 
them into one or the other half, scientific or nonscientific.‟44  On the other hand, 
Popperian science hinges on the scientist testing and evaluating competing 
theories.  In Popperian science, the emphasis is on the evaluation of theory as 
opposed to the evaluation of „objectively‟-derived facts.45     
                                                            
40 Ibid, 482. 
41 Clausing, 467. 
42 See Sir Francis Bacon, Novum Organum (Joseph Devey, ed., 1902), 50 („There are and can be 
only two ways of searching into and discovering truth. The one flies from the senses and 
particulars to the most general axioms, and from these principles, the truth of which it takes for 
settled and immoveable, proceeds to judgment and to the discovery of middle axioms. And this 
way is now in fashion. The other derives axioms from the senses and particulars, rising by 
gradual and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most general axioms last of all. This is the 
true way, but as yet untried.‟) 
43 Ibid. 
44 McCloskey, 510. 
45 Ibid, 483 („More recently Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, and Imre Lakatos among others have 
undermined the positivist supposition that scientific progress does in fact follow Descartes´ 
doubting rules of method.‟). 
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Given the theoretical obfuscation of the theory of tax incidence, 
econometricians in the field of taxation seized the opportunity afforded by the 
lack of clarity to „„prove‟„ the implications of the „„small open economy‟„ by 
statistical analysis alone.  Not surprisingly, that effort failed remarkably.46  In 
response, Clausing identified the importance of theory to tax incidence analysis, 
explaining: „„One pervasive problem in this work is a failure to consider the 
underlying theoretical mechanisms of open-economy general equilibrium tax 
incidence; empirical strategies often do not address these mechanisms.‟„47 The 
critical lesson is that Baconian science is consistent with subjectivism when 
applied to economic theory whereas Popperian science is absolutely not.  This 
explains why McCloskey´s proposal for subjectivist rhetoric as economic theory 
was given in opposition to Popperian theory.48  Accordingly, it is appropriate to 
re-assert an epistemology of science in the field of taxation against subjectivism 
such as the small open economy model.49 
 
SUBJECTIVISM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 
 
McCloskey rejected the role of scientific inquiry in economic analysis 
entirely.  The assertion was that, „[s]cientific knowledge is no different from 
other personal knowledge.  Trying to make it different, instead of better, is the 
death of science.‟50  Popper, of course, argued that scientific knowledge must be 
subject to falsification by testing.51  This allows one to separate science from 
religion, for example.  McCloskey, however, welcomes the idea of economics as a 
form of religion.52  McCloskey thus adopts Rorty´s conception of scientific 
knowledge as reflecting acquired wisdom.  He writes: 
 
In Richard Rorty´s words, following Dewey, the search for the foundations of 
knowledge by Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, Russell, and Carnap was “the 
                                                            
46 C.g. Mihir Desai, C. Fritz Foley & James Hines, Jr., Labor and Capital Shares of the Corporate 
Tax Burden: International Evidence, NBER working paper series („Evidence from applying this 
framework to these data indicates that between 45 and 75 percent of the burden of corporate 
taxes is borne by labor with the balance borne by capital.‟) Altshuler, Harris & Toder, 362 
(„Given the importance of international trade and capital flows, it seems artificial to work with 
closed-economy models. Once we allow for international capital mobility, domestic owners of 
capital may be able to escape the tax by moving capital abroad, turning the original Harberger 
result on its head.‟). 
47 Clausing, 438-9. 
48 McCloskey, 491 („Anyone would commend the vision of science that Popper and his followers 
have – of science as a self-correcting exploration verging on the dialectic otherwise so foreign to 
the analytic tradition in philosophy.‟). 
49 For a discussion of legal doctrine in contrast to either economics or scientific inquiry see 
Richard Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, (1993) 45 Stanford Law Review 1647, 1651 („The 
doctrinalists – the traditionalists in academic law – thus are being crowded by economic 
analysts of law, by other social scientists of law, by Bayesians, by philosophers of law, by critical 
legal scholars, by feminist and by gay legal scholars, by the law and literature crowd, and by 
critical race theorists, all deploying the tools of nonlegal disciplines.‟). 
50 McCloskey, 488 citing Michael Polyani, Personal Knowledge: Towards a post-critical 
philosophy (1962) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 
51 Popper, 10. 
52 McCloskey, 486. 
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triumph of the quest for certainty over the quest for wisdom”.  To reinstate 
rhetoric properly understood is to reinstate wider and wiser reasoning.53  
 
With this subjectivist approach, McCloskey proposes that even mathematics is 
ultimately subjective in the evaluation of proofs by mathematicians.54  
Economic terms are also revealed as metaphors, as he says „one might 
acknowledge the metaphorical element in verbal economics about the 
„entrepreneur‟, for instance, or more plainly of the „invisible hand‟.55  The idea of 
all language as metaphor represents a form of radical subjectivism.56  Under this 
view flavored by Rorty, wider and wiser reasoning is applied to generate more 
persuasive argument to reveal scientific knowledge. 
The evaluation of competing subjective claims can be very difficult, 
however.  A major problem in subjectivist economics is that scientists then 
insert claims of relative belief into argumentation even without cognizance of 
having done so.57  McCloskey gives the following belief-words emphasized: 
 
We think it unlikely that the high degree of national and international 
commodity arbitrage that many versions of the monetarist [sic] theory of the 
balance of payments contemplate is typical in the real world.  This is not to 
deny that the price structures of the advanced industrial countries are not 
linked together, but it is to suggest that the links are loose rather than 
rigid.58 
 
Harberger´s argumentation in the tax incidence literature slips into the same 
form of belief-words style of rhetorical argument.  He writes: 
 
First, concerning the corporation income tax rate itself, as it applies to the 
“normal” rate of return to capital in a developing country, there can be little 
doubt that it ends up causing wage rates to be lower than they would have 
been without the tax. The reason, of course, is that the capital stock would 
be higher without the tax than with it.  Thinking about this aspect, it is 
tempting to focus on foreign direct investment…. This temptation should 
be resisted, for policymakers should realize that it is quite natural for 
owners of wealth who reside in developing countries to hold part of that 
wealth abroad… (emphasis added)59 
 
Each of the italicized „belief‟-words given by Harberger is indicative of an 
unstated assumption in the analytical framework.  McCloskey thought that the 
                                                            
53 Ibid, 483. 
54 Ibid, 492 („They assert that “informal mathematics is mathematics.  Formalization is only an 
abstract possibility which no one would want or be able to carry out.”  Real proofs “are 
established by ´consensus of the qualified´” and are not checkable… by any mathematician not 
privy to the gestalt.‟). 
55 McCloskey, 505. 
56 For a further example of radical subjectivism in the field of taxation see Anthony Infanti & 
Bridget Crawford, Critical Tax Theory: An Introduction (2009) (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press). 
57 Ibid, 497 („No wonder: without a rhetoric of economic significance, and in the face of a 
modernist rhetoric of statistical significance with the prestige of alleged science behind it, they 
are unaware they are wielding it.‟). 
58 McCloskey, 496 citing Irving Kravis & Robert Lipsey, Price Behavior in the Light of Balance of 
Payments Theories, (1978) 8:2 Journal of International Economics 193. 
59 Harberger, 310. 
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unconscious use of rhetorical device in economic argumentation was potentially 
embarrassing to the field.60 Subjectivism often also entails indirectly proving 
who is apparently the „smartest‟ mathematician (or economist), and thus able to 
generate the most persuasive argument.  As McCloskey writes:  
 
Samuelson´s skill at mathematics in the eyes of his readers, an impression 
nurtured at every turn, it itself an important and persuasive argument.  He 
presents himself as an authority, with good reason.  That the mathematics is 
often pointless, as here, is beside the point.61  
 
The strength of argumentation is then evaluated based on the perceived 
intelligence or authority of the speaker.  A prime example might be Harberger 
himself who is indeed very persuasive to other economists.  Subjectivism starts 
to break down, however, where persuasive arguments are not given logically or 
coherently.  Several tax scholars have indeed noted that it is logically impossible 
to abandon the economic concept of the elasticity of labor supply by deeming 
labor „immobile‟.62  Bird and Zolt refer to such contradictions in incidence 
analysis as „having it both ways.‟63  McCloskey likewise pointed out that at times 
economists tend to make rhetorical points by simply ignoring a countervailing 
aspect of economic theory in a „model‟.64   
One possible means to reconcile Popperian theory with a view of 
scientific knowledge as „wisdom‟ is that Popper wrote on the logic of scientific 
discovery – that is, acquiring new knowledge.  Rhetorical argument is based on 
existing knowledge outside the framework of scientific discovery as opposed to 
regurgitation.  However, in the field of taxation the emphasis is typically on 
acquiring new knowledge as opposed to applying existing „wisdom‟ about 
taxation.  Thus, how one inductively appraises the state of existing knowledge in 
the field of taxation is the deciding factor as to the level of rhetoric (ie, argument 
from wisdom) allowable in scientific inquiry.  As to tax incidence, the goal is to 
apply the rules of scientific discovery to derive a better model that is workable as 
a scientific theory in the real world.   
 
  
                                                            
60 McCloskey, 494 („Even in the most narrowly technical matters of scientific discussion 
economists have a shared set of convictions about what makes an argument strong, but a set 
which they have not examined, which they can communicate to graduate students only tacitly, 
and which contains many elements embarrassing to the official rhetoric.‟). 
61 Ibid, 500. 
62 Bird & Zolt, 1640. 
63 Ibid („The incidence of consumption taxes rests on the assumption that all demands are 
perfectly inelastic (or supplies perfectly elastic), while the incidence of income and wealth 
taxation often makes exactly the opposite assumption: that supplies are perfectly inelastic (or 
demands perfectly elastic). One cannot have it both ways. Nevertheless, the usual simple 
summing of the numbers obtained on the basis of contradictory assumptions in effect does 
this.‟). 
64 McCloskey, 501 („Another common argument in economics with no status in the official 
rhetoric is philosophical consistency: “If you assume the firm knows its own cost curve you 
might as well assume it knows its production function, too: it is no more dubious that it knows 
one than the other.”‟). 
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A „SMALL PERSON ECONOMY‟ MODEL OF TAX INCIDENCE  
 
Science must relate to the real word.  A scientific theory which does not 
relate to the real world is not replicable, and therefore, does not operate with 
predictive force and must be rejected.  In most areas of scientific endeavor, such 
as theoretical physics, a new theory would need to operate with better predictive 
force than an existing theory.  The introduction of the theory of general 
relativity by Einstein in comparison to Newtonian physics is a prime example.  
However, because of the potential for ergodicity in the social sciences it is 
potentially more difficult to derive a replicable theory.  Where a prior theory is 
agreed not to function at all, then the bar is very low for the introduction of 
„science‟ in the form of a functional theory.  Since the „small open economy‟ 
model does not operate with predictive force in the real world it renders the 
situation uniquely ripe for the introduction of a competing theory of tax 
incidence.  The methodological goal is to replace the prior theory of tax 
incidence with a better theory which might operate with predictive force in the 
real economy.  As was the preferred method of Sir Isaac Newton it is helpful to 
set forth a theory with a series of propositions followed by one or more 
hypotheses.  Accordingly, each of the propositions of the “small person 
economy” model supplants a nominally unrealistic aspect of the prior theory of 
tax incidence.  The „Small Person Economy‟ model is premised on the following 
series of propositions and given hypotheses relating to tax incidence: 
   
Balance Sheet Propositions: 
 
(i) Large corporations hold stockpiled reserves of cash (in multiples of 
annual income) and do not pay out earnings to shareholders as 
dividends.65 
(ii) Individual taxpayers (i.e., „Small Persons‟ subject to wage 
withholding) pay tax out of current earnings and not savings.66 
(iii) Money is fungible.67  
 
Tax Propositions: 
 
(iv) Corporate income taxes are levied on „taxable income‟, but paid in 
cash.68 
(v) Individual income taxes are levied on wage income, and paid out of 
income (not savings).69   
                                                            
65 See Sarah Frier, U.S. Companies Hold Record $1.64 Trillion in Cash, Bloomberg News (Mar. 
31, 2014); Laura Hodrick, Are U.S. Firms Really Holding Too Much Cash? SIEPR Policy Brief 
(July 2013). 
66 See Jillian Berman, Marketwatch News, More than half of millennials have less than $1,000 
<www.marketwatch.com/story/more-than-half-of-millennials-have-less-than-1000-2015-12-
14>. 
67 It is not entirely clear why prior economic models of tax incidence do not presume money is 
fungible.  See Bird & Zolt, 1640; McCloskey, 501. 
68 For a discussion of cash based decision-making in the real world see Robert Kyosaki & Sharon 
Lechter, Rich Dad, Poor Dad (2000).  The prior economic models presume that corporations 
make tax decisions based on a „return on investment‟ theory that tracks taxable income as 
opposed to „cash flow‟.   
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Price Level Propositions:  
 
(vi) The numeraire is given as the price of labor expressed in local 
currency. 
(vii) Labor supply is determined by its elasticity.70   
(viii) The economy is a „service-based‟ economy where output is derived 
entirely from labor where (π = ΔL) (Y = f(L)). 
(ix) Taxation of labor increases the relative cost of labor to capital.71 
 
Economic Propositions: 
 
(x) Government spending is fixed by a budget set in advance (ie, 
spending is not a function of tax revenues collected).   
(xi) Marginal incomes of taxpayer firms are determined by „small person‟ 
spending in the economy.72  
(xii) The „old‟ domestic firms that pay corporate tax extract „rents‟ from the 
economy without incremental capital investment.73   
(xiii) Marginal capital investment is determined by „new‟ firms purchasing 
domestic labor with previously undeployed capital. 
 
First Hypothesis:  „Small persons‟ are pass-through from a macroeconomic 
perspective.  The labor taxes paid by consumers directly reduce spending in the 
economy which reduces corporate profits by an approximately equal amount.   
With the levy of wage taxation, „small persons‟ accordingly bear a first burden of 
tax incidence by reduced consumer spending. 
 
Second Hypothesis:  Capital taxes function to reduce the stockpiled reserves 
of cash held by large corporations; yet labor taxes also reduce indirectly the 
value of capital reserves by an increase in price levels.  If corporations do not 
pay taxes, the price of labor increases by the amount of offsetting labor taxes, 
which decreases the purchasing power of capital to use labor to drive production 
in the economy.  This entails a double incidence effect from the taxation of labor 
earnings. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
69 European Parliament Statistics, Tax Policy in the EU, 10: 51% EU proportion labour tax 
receipts 
<www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/549001/EPRS_IDA%282015%295490
01_EN.pdf>; Internal Revenue Service, Data Book Statistics Line(s) 11, 14 Individual 
withholding: 38.2% of total; employment taxes: 31.9% of total; net approximately 70.1% of 
Federal tax receipts from wage withholding.  
70 See Olivier Bargain, Kristian Orsini & Andreas Peichl, „Comparing Labor Supply Elasticities in 
Europe and the US: New Results‟, Institute for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 6735 
(July, 2012) <ftp.iza.org/dp6735.pdf>. 
71 See Roger H. Gordon, Inflation, Taxation and Corporate Behavior, 99 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 313 (1984). 
72 See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Labor Statistics, detailed statistics on the 
proportion of consumer spending in the economy 
<www.bea.gov/national/consumer_spending.htm>. 
73 See Clausing, 436 citing Auerbach.  Notably, Auerbach applies a pre-modern definition of 
scientific inquiry where nothing is known until proven by econometrics.  This Baconian 
approach to “science” is contrary to the modern scientific approach applied here. 
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Third Hypothesis: The marginal incidence of both labor and capital taxation 
is borne by the undeployed factors of production in the economy (ie, the 
unemployed labor force or undeployed capital).74  The market price is set by a 
dynamic bid process, so the party which needs to make the bid is the price taker 
and can be increased by marginal taxation of labor.   
 
„Double‟ Tax Incidence Effects 
 
The hypotheses set forth above indicate a „double‟ tax incidence effect of 
labor taxation.  Where „small persons‟ with insignificant cash holdings or 
savings are forced to pay taxes out of current earnings this reduces dollar-for-
dollar consumer spending in the economy.  As such, there are two (ie, „double‟) 
tax incidence effects from labor taxation and only a single incidence effect from 
capital taxation.  The first incidence effect with labor taxation is that the 
consumer spending of „small persons‟ is obviously reduced.  The second 
incidence effect of labor taxes is borne by businesses which suffer reduced 
capital accumulations from the decline in consumer spending.  So, the net 
reduction in savings occurs at the corporate level when „rents‟ are reduced, 
which is the only place where a savings reduction can occur in the „Small Person‟ 
economy model.  Accordingly, the significant aspect of tax incidence is not 
merely an implied reduction in return on investment by the taxation of income, 
but the reduction in net income from the taxation of labor income plus the 
follow-on reduction in consumer spending.   
 
Discussion of Realistic and Unrealistic Assumptions in the Current 
Model 
 
As was also true in the early-1930‟s large corporations now seek first and 
foremost to accumulate balance-sheet capital without paying dividends to 
corporate shareholders, and thus, operate their existing business lines as a 
quasi-annuity.75  Accordingly, corporate income taxation reduces the stockpile 
of corporate balance-sheet capital.  If the net present value of an annuity is 
reduced by income taxation that certainly reduces the value of the annuity to the 
holder of the annuity, but does not require the business to forego the annuity.  
Clausing refers to this description of corporate business activity as extracting 
„rents‟ from an economy.76  She writes: „However, to the extent the corporate tax 
is really a tax on rents rather than on capital in the corporate sector the 
implications are different.  A tax on pure profits may have an impact on where 
profits are reported, and perhaps the underlying economic activity, but it will 
have a lesser effect on relative factor use.‟77  The idea of corporate „rent-seeking‟ 
is a more realistic description of the modern economy than either of 
Harberger´s „open‟- versus „closed‟-economy models. 
                                                            
74 Ibid. 
75 Stephen Bank, Is Double Taxation a Scapegoat for Declining Dividends? Evidence from 
History, (2003) 56 Tax Law Review 463. 
76 Clausing, 437 („The firms that pay corporate tax are very large, possibly suggesting a role for 
economies of scale and considerations of imperfect competition that may generate rents‟). 
77 Ibid, 445 
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Money is fungible.  This is also a more realistic economic assumption for 
any model of tax incidence.  If money is fungible, then in a given economy price 
levels are relative and taxes which increase the cost of labor necessarily 
decreases the purchasing power of capital.  In other words, labor taxes are not 
defined as irrelevant to price levels.  In a service based economy, capital is used 
to purchase labor to generate economic output; hence, labor taxes are 
influential to price levels.  
The „small person‟ economy theory is also subject to obvious limitations 
based on unrealistic propositions.  For example, some portion of consumer 
spending is saved, or derived from savings, so in actual fact „small persons‟ are 
not entirely pass-through from a macroeconomic perspective.  Also, even in a 
„service-based‟ economy output is not entirely driven by consumer spending so 
some capital is deployed as capital investment; and, in many industries a trade-
off may be possible as between capital and labor.78  Furthermore, not all large 
corporations operate as „rent-seekers‟ and may deploy capital for marginal 
investment in the given economy.  Nonetheless, since the propositions of the 
„small person‟ economy are openly stated it is possible to augment or challenge 
the hypotheses in a scientific manner.  That is the methodological goal 
irrespective as to whether the results turn out to be acceptable.  Tax incidence 
analysis needs to move from pure rhetoric to a scientific method where 
hypotheses are first proposed by „creative intuition‟ as Einstein proposed, and 
then either challenged by falsification,79 and/or augmented.80   
 
Point-by-Point Comparison of the “Small Open” versus “Small 
Person” Models 
 
Harberger ultimately gave seven policy recommendations derived from his tax 
incidence modeling.  However, as noted here, several of Harberger´s given tax 
policy recommendations were seemingly unrelated to the underlying model.  
The methodological approach of deriving an economic “model” and then 
positing unrelated conclusions is a fundamental aspect of a subjectivist (ie, 
rhetorical) approach in economics.  Each of the policy points are summarized 
here with a short explanation of the implied alternative policy result from the 
“small person economy” model:   
 
(1) Harberger:  „First, there can be little doubt that it ends up causing wage rates 
to be lower than they would have been without the tax.‟81 
 
 „Small Person‟ Model:  No, wage rates would be expected to be 
relatively higher with incremental corporate taxation.  Undeployed 
capital and unemployed labor would bear the marginal incidence 
of incremental taxation.  
 
                                                            
78 Ibid, 457 („Since the corporate tax incidence mechanism is driven by a relationship between 
corporate taxation and the capital stocks that workers have at their disposal, it is also useful to 
examine the relationship between corporate tax variables and capital/labor ratios.‟). 
79 Popper, 35. 
80 Ulen, 34. 
81 Harberger, 310. 
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(2) Harberger: „Second, when it comes to extractive industries, royalties or 
separate taxes focused on those particular industries tend to make more 
sense than allowing “extractive considerations” to govern one‟s choice of a 
corporation income tax rate.‟82 
 
 „Small Person‟ Model:  No, the design of tax policy for each 
developing nation would depend at least in part on endogenous 
factors including capital levels, labor force participation, and many 
others.   
 
(3) Harberger: „Third, the greater is the extent to which corporation income 
taxes fall on monopoly profits, the stronger is the case for a higher rate of 
corporation income tax.‟83 
 
 „Small Person‟ Model:  No, large corporations are „rent-seeking‟ 
and set out to extract „rents‟ in the marketplace without making 
incremental capital investment to increase profits.   
 
(4) Harberger: „Fourth, corporation income taxation is much easier to justify if 
there is some degree of integration with the personal income tax. I indicated 
above that full integration seems to have turned out to be impractical, but 
partial integration based on dividends makes a great deal of sense.‟84 
 
 „Small Person‟ Model:  No, large corporations generally do not 
distribute profits to shareholders and this assumption of „double‟-
taxation reflects an unrealistic aspect of economic theory.   
 
(5) Harberger: „Fifth, to go beyond integration and have a genuine, separate and 
additional corporation income tax rate, the best justifications are: a) that 
such taxation will take on a bigger bite out of monopoly profits (striking 
them, presumably, at both the corporate and personal levels, and b) that 
such taxation may be a way to get at some of the mineral rents that accrue to 
extractive–industry companies operating under old arrangements that are 
considered to be inviolable.‟85 
 
 „Small Person‟ Model:  Agreed; however, neither model addresses 
extractive-industry tax policy.   
 
(6) Harberger: „Sixth, no developing country should contemplate its tax policy 
with respect to corporation (or enterprise) income without giving extensive 
attention to the problem of tax competition from other developing 
countries.‟86 
 
                                                            
82 Ibid, 310. 
83 Ibid, 311. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Harberger, 312. 
86 Ibid. 
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 „Small Person‟ Model:  No, tax rates influence price levels which is 
merely one aspect of overall macroeconomic policy.  For example, 
tax policy will typically be reflected in the local currency exchange 
rate.  However, a particular design of the tax system in a 
developing country could yield microeconomic (ie, firm-specific) 
benefits.  Accordingly, endogenous factors make an economy more 
or less attractive to undeployed capital; specific firms might gain 
advantages (or disadvantages) relative to other firms from the 
design of a tax system.87  
 
(7) Harberger: „Seventh, and finally, the maintenance of the “shell” of a 
corporation income tax has administrative advantages even if all other 
considerations are absent.‟88 
 
 „Small Person‟ Model:  Agreed; however, neither model addresses 
administrative costs of a tax system.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
A subjective economic approach to tax incidence analysis yields three 
immediate tax policy effects.  First, tax policy derived from economic theory is 
given primarily by rhetorical means based on acquired Rortyan-„wisdom‟; 
second, where acquired wisdom is insufficient to operate with predictive force 
then a phenomenology of the „one-armed economist‟, as U.S. President Harry 
Truman quipped, becomes highly desirable to tax policymakers;89 and third, 
professional economists will inevitably aver that only an economist is equipped 
to advise on matters of tax policy as economic policy, and „clinicians‟ (e.g., tax 
lawyers and accountants) are irrelevant to tax policy.90  As a result, it becomes 
very difficult for tax policymakers to apply any economic „model‟ of tax 
incidence to derive tax policy in the real world, particularly where economic 
theory has little or no relation to the real world, by design.   
McCloskey and others express concern with the influence of „Philosopher 
Kings‟;91 yet, the real concern is over the use of rhetorical device by economists 
masquerading as scientific inquiry.92  In the field of taxation a theory of „science‟ 
is a theory that operates with predictive force in the real world.  The proverbial 
„one-armed economist‟ could be more aptly termed a „scientist‟ of economic 
                                                            
87 If a developing country pegs its exchange rate, then tax policy may operate as a form of tax 
competition from its macroeconomic effects. 
88 Harberger, 312. 
89 On the Third Hand: Humor in the dismal science, an anthology (Caroline Postelle Clotfelter 
ed.) (1996) (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press), 5. 
90 McCloskey, 491 („For an economic scientist to adopt an obdurate refusal to consider 
objections and to resist offering hostages to evidence, though as common in modernist as in 
nonmodernist circles, is not merely unscientific; it is cowardly.‟). 
91 Ibid, 482 („[E]conomics, like any field, should get its standard of argument from itself, not 
from the legislation of philosopher kings.‟); Harberger, 310 („It is not a good idea to dream up 
“general solutions” to complex policy problems.‟). 
92 Ibid, 484 („[T]the rejection of econometrics, for instance, would be reasonable only if its more 
naïve claims were taken seriously.  For the rest, economists have let philosophical scribblers of a 
few years back supply their official thinking about what a good argument is.‟). 
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policy.  Truman´s expressed frustration with the advice of economists was 
actually a frustration with the non-application of a scientific method to 
economics as a function of tax policy.  As Clausing further explains: 
 
In sum, the theoretical work in this area is rich and deep, but it raises as many questions 
as it answers. In the classic general equilibrium models of Harberger, Gravelle and 
Smetters, and Randolph, labor bears a share of the corporate tax that depends critically 
on a number of parameters such as the degree of international capital mobility, the 
degree of international product substitution, the relative capital intensity of the 
corporate sector, the size of the country, and the degree of factor substitution.93 
 
A theory of science must be testable, and therefore, be subject to question 
in the future and even potential falsification.  However, an economic „model‟ 
that neither tests an existing theory, nor informs the derivation of theory, is 
worthless to any scientific inquiry.  If such an economic „model‟ is held as truth 
then it has morphed to a form of religious belief and stands opposed to scientific 
inquiry.94  McCloskey described the failure of these conditions as a realization 
that the „economic emperor has positively no clothes.‟95  As to tax incidence 
analysis, Clausing has presented what she refers to as additional „parameters‟ 
relevant to the conventional „model‟ of tax incidence, or as a matter of science, 
the conventional theory of tax incidence.  The citation of such obviously relevant 
factors is not merely an inconvenience with the burden on Clausing to prove by 
statistics an economic effect from such „parameters‟.  Rather, as a matter of 
science, if a „model‟ applied as theory appears to be flawed, then a new theory 
should be proposed that might be more realistic and potentially operate with 
predictive force.  This might be accomplished by augmenting an existing theory 
with additional parameters under a Bayesian method, or outright falsification 
under a Popperian method.  Here, given both the „small open‟-, and also, the 
„closed‟-economy iterations given by Harberger are highly unrealistic (and 
contain logical contradiction) an outright falsification in the Popperian sense is 
plausible.   
The „small person economy‟ theory is an attempt to then fill the void with 
an alternative scientific theory of tax incidence.  This approach applies more 
realistic propositions about the economy.  For example, where „small persons‟ 
pay labor taxes out of current earnings such reduces welfare directly and causes 
a first incidence effect.  However, labor taxation also entails a „pass-through‟ 
effect via reduced consumer spending in the macroeconomy which is a second 
incidence effect.  This dual incidence is referred to as „double‟ incidence effects 
of labor taxation.  The „„small person” economy theory suggests that labor taxes 
also increase the price level in a service economy thereby reducing the 
purchasing power of stockpiled capital.  As to tax policy, marginal tax effects are 
relevant meaning a change in tax methods from a given status quo that might be 
relevant to the tax policymaker.  Here, the „small person‟ economy theory 
                                                            
93 Clausing, 438. 
94 McCloskey, 491 („The problem comes, and the modernist preaching begins, with the word 
“evidence”.  Should it be all “objective,” “experimental,” “positive,” “observable”? Can it be?‟). 
95 Ibid, 482 („Economics will not change much in substance, of course, when economists 
recognize that the economic emperor has positively no clothes…. They claim to be arguing on 
grounds of certain limited matters of statistical inference, on grounds of positive economics, 
operationalism, behaviorism, and other positivistic enthusiasms of the 1930s and 1940s.‟).   
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suggests the incidence of both marginal labor and capital taxation is borne by 
the undeployed or unemployed factors of production in the economy. 
